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Introduction
For Americans the 1930s narked an end to economic prosoerlty and the 
beginning of economic deoression. The public and many political figures 
tv.Mii q.iesth ' im ' ik ; the extent to which gjvernren: sho-’d ?e involved in 
business. Did the role of government include guaranteeing a decent livlnq 
environment— jobs, food, clothing, shelter— for its citizens? During this 
period the social security bill was passed by Congress and signed Into law 
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Social security originated In a climate 
of high unemployment, a period of poverty for many of America's elderly, 
and an extremely depressed economic state. The deoression raised the public­
awareness of just how vulnerable a situation they were living 1n. The nubile 
supported many different proposals— Long's Share Our Wealth Plan, the Lundeen 
Bill, the Townsend Old Age Pension Plan, Father Coughlin's National Union for 
Social Justice— all of which offered a solution to the economic situation In 
the United States. The government attempted to deal with the economic situ­
ation through civil works and Federal relief programs. The social security 
bill which emerged at this time was one aspect of the government's solution 
to the depressed economic state of the American public.
1
Chapter I
Unemployment 1r the 1930s
The Great Depression of the 1930s resulted In highly unstable 
living conditions for most Americans as unemployment reached extremely 
high levels. Statistics from the National Industrial Conference Board 
placed the peak level of unemployment 1n March 1933, at nearly 15 million, 
roughly 29 percent of the work force. Annual unemployment rates were over 
10 million 1n 1932, 1933, and 1934. It was also apparent that the figures 
tended to "understate" the phenomenon of mass unemployment; statistics 
failed to show that many people worked only part time, and that, full time 
employees worked reduced hours or with less payj Because of high unemploy­
ment, Americans could not be sure of a yearly Income; planning for the fu­
ture became almost Impossible.
At this time, there were no programs to shelter employees from the 
hazards of unemployment. Income protection for the aged could be found In 
public and private pensions, but only 10 percent of the Individuals over 65 
were receiving such benefits. There were some private plans covering unem­
ployment, but they covered only a negligible number of Americans, less than 
0.5 percent of employees 1n nonfarm enterprises. Most workers were forced 
Into unemployment with no supplementary Income available. Although workmen 
compensation laws, which protected Individuals who had lost Income as a re­
sult of Industrial accidents, were 1n effect In all but four states, the 
numerous restrictions attached to these laws reduced their effectiveness con­
siderably. The 1931 Handbook of Labor Statistics states: "The result of the
2
3various restrictions has been computed as placing upon the Injured worker 
about 50 percent of the burden of Industrial accidents 1n the most favor*
4
able states and from 65 to 80 percent In those less favorable." On the 
whole, the Individual worker did not have any real substantial income pro­
tection, but this was never viewed as a problem until the depression.
When the individual American found himself unemployed , he usually 
had little or no savings and numerous debts. According to the 1965 Econom­
ic Report of the President, "For the country as a whole, annual per capita 
disposable Income, measured in current prices, fell from $652 in 1929 to 
$364 1n 1933. . . . There was a total of 6.4 billion dollars in consumer 
debt outstanding in 1929, reflecting the spread of installment buying during 
the preceding prosperous years." Even those individuals who had accumulated 
savings were not able to take advantage of them since most were lost during 
bank failures. This Immense loss of disposable Income along with Individual 
debts shows what a bleak future numerous Americans faced in the 1930s.
Many individuals were forced tg seek aid during this economic crisis. 
Some were forced to almshouses, the poorhouses which still had " all the 
stigma of degradation, disgrace, and defeat."” Unemployed workers chose this 
route only as a last resort since it was demeaning to oneself and one's fami­
ly. Many people turned to friends and relatives for loans, yet such assis­
tance proved inadequate. In early 1933, Professor Sllchter of Harvard re­
ported that "'the proportion of unemployed who have exhausted their resources 
and the resources of their friends and relatives 1s rapidly rising. ' " 7 A 
1942 report to the National Resources Planning Board found that
'had the general decline 1n economic activity been shortlived,
it Is probable that the emergency might have been met by 
methods which had been used in the past— namely, greater 
reliance on private charity. . . the expansion of public 
relief and occasional special emergency appropriations of 
public funds. 1 8
Thus, even after an individual realized he was not financially capable and 
sought support elsewhere— almshouses, friends, charities— he still found 
himself 1n a desparate economic situation. The depression was not short­
lived and the economic crisis compelled the government Into developing solu­
tions.
The economic situation demanded Immediate attention not only because of 
the physical consequences of the loss of employment-little food, loss of 
shelter, deteriorating clothing, etc.--but also because of Its psychological 
effects. In the summer of 1932, Professor Earl Edward Eubank conducted a 
study on the effects of unemployment for the Ohio Commission on Unemoloy-
q
ment Insurance. Professor Eubank found the mental condition of the unem­
ployed worker and M s  family to be one of humiliation and anxiety. He suf­
fered humiliation because of M s  Inability to properly feed and dress his 
children, he was forced to accept charity, and many of their possessions 
were being repossessed or sold in order to purchase necessities. The unem­
ployed worker also suffered from extreme anxiety because he could not plan 
for his future. He felt unsure of how long he could continue 1n his present 
condition and often viewed himself as a failure In providing for his family. 
Many social consequences resulted from the depressed economic and mental state 
of the family. Professor Eubank noted that an increase in crime occurred 
because people felt less responsible for their actions. The level of com­
munity health was lowered due to unsanitary living conditions, the inability 
to obtain medical care, and the diseases resulting from undernourishment.
5The American public'regarded the economic depression with bewilderment.
It was difficult to understand how the United States, after decades of
growth and prosper1ty,had reached such a depressed economic state.^ The
attitude of the people, reflected in the 1932 presidential election, was
that this situation should not cont1nue--something had to be done. However,
no specific solution was proposed. When voters elected Franklin Roosevelt
president in 1932 they did not endorse a specific program, only a change 1n 
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leadership. Roosevelt projected confidence and optimism toward the future 
which led the people to believe he could devise a solution to improve the 
situations of the poor, the unemployed, and the "forgotten man." 4
Problems Ol tM. Elderly
The depression revealed a declining ability of elderly Americans to sup­
port themselves at a time when this age group was increasing at very signifi­
cant rates. "It is estimated that the aged (65 or over) constituted 2.1 per 
cent of the population in 1850, rising to 4.07 in 1900, 4.30 by 1910, and 5.67 
by 1920. This rate of increase was greater for each decade between 1900 and 
1930 than the national increase, or the population under 65."^ Elderly Amer­
icans were a group which had previously turned to families, friends, charity 
groups, and the almshouses when in need. But the depression along with moderni­
zation and industrialization had changed the situation for the growing elderly 
population.
American family structure was no longer as closely knit as it had once 
been. Migration of families from rural to Industrialized cities resulted in 
more nuclear family units. The number of extended rural families, where the
6elderly parent could contribute to work around the home and farm, had de­
creased. Families living In cities had neither adequate physical space 
for elderly parents or relatives noi adequate income and food to support 
them. Thus the strong family bond was broken. As Luhove states in The 
Struggle for Social Security. "To argue that old-age assistance threated 
family solidarity because, in the last resort, children would support their 
aged parents was equally immoral and absurd. Many workers could barely sup­
port their own families, and the argument had no relevance to the aged with­
out children."*^
Most of the elderly were unable to support themselves. Technological 
changes and the increased hiring of younger workers made it difficult for 
the elderly to maintain a stable position within the labor force. The 
younger worker was more physically able or found it easier to adapt to the 
technological changes than the older worker. Both of these factors were in­
volved in the increase of the dependent aged. In 1930 the proportion of de­
pendent aged was estimated at being 40? of those individuals aged 65 and 
over, or 2.7 million people. By 1935 the percentage of dependent aged had 
Increased to approximately 50%. Yet the majority of these dependent indi­
viduals could not turn to their families for economic support.
Most elderly Americans were unable to depend upon savings for support in 
their old age. The American myth of working and being able to save enough 
for retirement was shown to be mistaken. As David Hackett Fischer points 
out in Old Age Becomes A Social Problem, "Though thrift has always been an 
American ideal, 1t has never been an American habit. For most Americans In 
the past, saving was impossible. The price of labor closely shadowed the
7cost of living, and employment was unstable, even for men in the prime of 
life." Thus, what was supposed to be the most relaxing and enjoyable 
part of one's life turned into, for many, destitution. Many people who 
had wor.ad their entire lives were forced into retirement with no resources.
Vet since belief in the American work ethic remained strong, proposals 
to aid the elderly were met with extreme objections. Lubove cited the ap­
pearance of a "New Individualism." In the case of the aged this was close­
ly identified with welfare capitalism; it idealized voluntary association
21to achieve collective ends. ' Such an ideology did not favor state pension 
plans or social security, since these approaches would interfere with indi­
vidual's independence and freedom of choice. Frederick L. Hoffman of Pruden­
tial Life Insurance, reflecting the "New Individualism" theory characterized 
the '"backbone of the nation1 as the independent citizen who managed in 'some 
way or another, by self-help. . . to avoid the more or less humiliating re­
liance upon public support.' He had most to lose if the state were to pro­
vide pensions, not only because of the tax burden but because of the threat
22
to his self-reliance." According to supporters of this point of view, el­
derly individuals without savings or families to care for them should turn 
to charity and the almshouses, not to the government. Hoffman believed that 
the "soundest contribution the state could make to old-age security was edu-
23
cation, especially in 'ideals of right living.'"
The elderly who found themselves with no means of support were forced to 
turn to almshouses, considered as a last resort because of the humiliation 
and sense of defeat attached to them. As Rimlinger indicates, "This humilia­
ting method of protection could remain acceptable for as long as only a small
8fraction of soeiety--marginal social groups--ran the risk of public re­
lief."^ Economic problems increased the number of aged individuals en­
tering almshouses for support; however, because of the significant in­
crease of the aged population between 1900 to 1930, the elderly could not 
be viewed as a marginal group.
The fart; that it was becominq extremely exoensive to support an el­
derly individual in the almshouse also added to the belief that something 
had to be done about the situation of America's poor elderly. "A survey of 
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that in 1930 the average 
cost per old-age pensioner throughout the country was $14.32 per month. A 
few years earlier the Bureau of Labor Statistics had estimated the average 
maintenance cost per inmate in an almshouse to be $27.88, not counting the 
capital cost of the physical facilities." Pensions were also affected by
individual need and could be more expensive than the Bureau of Labor Statis-
25
tics had estimated. The monetary facts greatly influenced those who had 
previously refused to recognize that something had to be done about the situ­
ation of the elderly.
Government studies of the almshouses showed them to be not only expensive 
but also inhumane. A Wisconsin study of the institutionalized aged stated
or
that the situation was "'gall and wormwood to the self-respecting Door.'" °
The Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted a survey in the mid-1920s on 2183 
almshouses, 90% of such institutions in the United States. The results sta­
ted, "1 (D)ilapidation, inadequacy, and even indecency1 were their 'outstanding 
physical features. . . Ignorance, unfitness, and a complete lack of compre­
hension of the social element involved in the conduct of a public institution
9(were) characteristic of a large part of their managing personnel. Among 
the inmates themselves insanity, feeble-mindedness, depravity, and respect- 
able old age (were) mingled in haphazard unconcern.1" It is understand­
able that the elderly viewed these institutions as a last resort. Mable 
Nassau, a social worker, conducted a survey prior to the 1920s using a sam­
ple of 100 elderly individuals living in Greenwich Village. As a result of 
the survey, Nassau saw the elderly "living in a state of chronic ‘economic 
fear, 1 especially the 'fear of being forced into some institution,' and the
effects of illness. With few exceptions they worked as long as possible,
28and tried to avoid charity." The elderly were experiencing fear over their 
future, poor living conditions especially in the almshouses, and the inabili­
ty to save for old age— these conditions indicated that something had to be 
done to aid the elderly.
The situation of the elderly had changed drastically as a result of the 
industrialization of America and the economic depression, Abraham Holtzman 
in The Townsend Movement: A Political Study recognized the people who made
up the dependent elderly group had significantly changed. "Their jobs elimi­
nated, businesses ruined and savings wiped out, an influx of despoiled pro­
fessional men, retired farmers, skilled workers and small businessmen entered 
the ranks of the dependent aged." They had believed in and fell victim to 
the American work ethic. As a result of their experiences, these new members
of the dependent elderly were receptive to protest regarding their situation
29
in the political arena. However, many groups failed to recognize the poli­
tical potential of directly involving the elderly in the actions of the or­
ganization. The American Association for Old Age Security, the American Pub-
10
lie Welfare Association, the American Association for Labor Legislation, all 
all involved in the attempt to obtain security for the elderly through pen­
sions and other social legislation, failed to include the elderly in their 
organizations.3^
The depression not only caused the problems of the elderly to become 
more pronounced, it also called attention to the fact that the United States 
had fallen behind a large number of European nations in providing social as­
sistance1 for the elderly. "Most European nations enacted compulsory old 
age insurance laws decades before America did--Germany in 1889, Austria in 
1906, England in 1908, France in 1910, Romania in 1912, Sweden in 1913,
In 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the need for social legisla­
tion in a message he sent to Congress. "'It is a reproach to us as a nation,' 
he declared, 'that in both Federal and State legislation we have afforded 
less protection to public and private employees than any other industrial
country in the world.' President Roosevelt's humanity was offended by the
32suffering of so many of his countrymen." Rimlinner suggests that the situ­
ation of the United States was similar to that of Germany in the 1880s. "An 
important development like the introduction of a comolex system of protection 
on a nationwide scale, perhaps, can be accomplished only in response to a ma- 
jor crisis." America's major crisis occurred during the economic depres­
sion of the 1930s. Previously the American public had held fast to their 
faith in the American work ethic and the success of the industrialization of 
America. "The political thought of Jefferson and the eocnomic thought of 
Adam Smith both rested upon the assumption that, as a remedy for the ills of 
the world. Nature was to be trusted more than Man. Social evils were thought
11
to be temporary impediments to the moral progress of mankind which would
A  M
inevitably be overcome." However since the depression with its high 
unemployment and widespread poverty was not a temporary impediment, action 
had to be taken.
Chapter I I
Early New Deal Programs
Upon taking office, President Roosevelt attempted to deal with unem­
ployment by asking Congress to establish the office of Federal Emergency 
'Relief Administration. On March 30, 1933 Congress passed a bill estab­
lishing such an agency. Roosevelt chose as administrator Harry L. Hopkins,
who had headed the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration when Roosevelt
35
was Governor of New York. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
was designed to work through public agencies and not directly with indi­
viduals. It had a $500 million budget, half of which was given out on a 
matching basis. The Relief Administration would supnly $1 for every $3 
the state spent on relief during a three month tine period. The remaining 
$250 million was to be appropriated when the matching requirement could not 
be met. Hopkins' goal for the agency was to preserve the needy individual's 
self-respect. "'I don't think anybody can go year after year, month after 
month, accepting relief without having his character change m  some way un­
favorably,' he wrote in June 1933."^
Work relief oroqrams were designed so that the relief recipient would 
work for the government aid. Teachers receiving relief benefits were placed 
in country schools which could not afford to hire teachers. The Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration also provided drought relief, supplied grants 
to aid local self-help and barter associations, and provided assistance to
12
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transient unemployed workers. The Relief Administration also established 
the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation which purchased excess commodities 
from farmers. It not only benefited the farmer but also the unemployed 
worker by distributing these foodstuffs. Congress also authorized the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration to "make capital grants to promote 
the 'barter of goods. 1
Roosevelt also appointed Hopkins to head the Civil Morks Administration. 
The Civil Works Administration, unlike the Federal Emergency Relief Administra 
t1on, would be directly involved in work projects. Its numerous projects 
included roads and highways, school and playground facilities, waterways, 
and ditches. At its highest operating level, the Civil Works Administration
■JQ
had 400 thousand existing programs and employed 4 million individuals.
Many different attitudes existed towards jobs provided by Civil Works
and aid received from Federal Relief. Many unemployed Individuals receiving
relief and jobs from the federal government saw Civil Works and Federal Re-
40
11ef as their last hope. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Pittsburgh, Hugh 
Charles Boyles, stated '"Inadequate though 1t may be, the emergency unemploy­
ment relief hus been and is the most staballzing force we have. . . The Fed­
eral Government will have to put un the money or -- well, God help us alii"' 
Mayor Quigley of Chelsa, Massachusetts indicated that out of the 2,155 unen- 
ployed workers in his town, only 155 individuals could get jobs from the 
Civil Works Administration. "'I believe,' said Mayor Quigley, 'that Federal 
Government, once having acknowledged its resoonsibility by giving jobs for 
the sake of a job, must now put every unemployed man to work doing the most
37
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useful taftk that can be found for him."' However extensive the service
that government was providing to individuals, to many, was not enough.
Business generally viewed the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
and Civil Works Administration quite negatively. Robert E. Woods of Sears
Roebuck stated, '"While it is probably true that we cannot allow everyone
to starve, we should tighten up relief all along the line, and if relief
is to be given it must be a bare subsistance allowance.'" Business viewed
42
civil work projects as competition with private enterprise. The Federal
Surplus Relief Corporation was seen as a competitor when it began using the
43
purchased surpluses to manufacture products for the unemployed. The feel­
ing existed that federal relief was working against American individualism 
and free enterprise. Banker Frank A. Vanderlip said, "'Our present efforts
in the direction of relief have broken down self-reliance and industry. 1
44profoundly believe that society does not owe every man a living.'"
Movements Promising Assistance to Individuals
While the government attempted*to deal with the unemoloyment situation
by initiating Federal Emergency Relief and Civil Work, movements which promised
to enhance the individual's position in society emerged. One of these Drograms
that gained considerable public support was the Townsend Old Age Revolving
Pension Plan. Dr. Francis E. Townsend, an a^sis-tantmedical officer from Long
45
Beach, California, developed the oension plan. The basic features of the 
program were purposely drawn to be easily understood: that all citizens aged
60 and older would be given $200 each month and that the $200 had to be spent 
within 30 days of receipt. Supporters claimed that the United States economy
41
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would benefit from this program in two ways: more money would be injected
into the economy, and the economic situation of the elderly would be great­
ly improved.^®
Approximately 10 million people supported the Townsend oension plan 1n
the mid 1930s by signing Townsend petitions, subscribing to the Townsend
Weekly, and becoming members of Townsend clubs.^ There are three reasons
why the Townsend pension olan anpealed to so many Americans. First, the
pension plan was very straightforward and easily understood by the average
American. Such a clear plan for an economic situation that appeared complex
48
and confusing was very appealing. In 1935, Dr. Townsend recognized this 
fact when he said, '"the greatest value of our plan is its simplicity, . . .
I don't want to depart from that. People can understand it.'" The pension 
plan appealed to the general public because it did not propose a radical 
change in the nation's economic system. The Townsend plan was concerned 
only with Improving the effectiveness of the current economic system. As 
Abraham Holtzman states in The Townsend Movement. "Tt was phrased in terms 
of everyday hopes and ambitions for jobs, higher wages and profits, comfort 
in old age." ^
Second, the plan was designed to appeal to Americans' traditionally con­
servative attitudes. It would not be implemented through radical means, but 
would be established through accepted political and legislative channels.
It would be funded by all Americans, through a 2 percent sales tax. According 
to Holtzman, Townsend "contended that Americans wanted to be taxed to provide 
for old age security." Dr. Townsend propos.ed that the oronram be implemented 
through already existing government agencies. He stated that, '" The Townsend
16
Plan will serve the . . . purpose of checking the alarming growth of 
Federal bureaucracy, which in my opinion, is a short cut to Facism.,"5) 
Townsend realized that the public is frequently frustrated by red tape 
and working with large bureaucratic agencies. By denouncing facism,
Townsend stressed that his pension should not be viewed us a radical program.
Third, America's elderly especially favored the Townsend pension plan 
because they would directly benefit from it* Holtzman estimated that in 
1935 the elderly membership of the 7 thousand Townsend clubs equalled 1.5 
million. The Townsend plan originated in California which had the fifth 
largest elderly population in the nation. This concentration of elderly in­
dividuals provided an excellent environment for the promotion of the Townsend 
pension plan. The plan received tangible results--suoport, publicity, po­
litical acknowledgement, financial aid--from this California community, and 
this success gained state-wide and national attention for the Townsend plan.^ 
The two hundred dollars the Townsend plan offered would make a substantial 
difference 1n the living conditions of many elderly individuals. Since the 
elderly could no longer depend upon financial assistance from their families, 
friends, or savings, the Townsend pension plan promised to provide them 
with some financial security. Holtzman determined that the Townsend plan 
"exploited the feelings of people in general toward the aged", as younger 
Americans would be relieved of guilt feelings over the economic plight of 
the aged.^
Although the Townsend plan appeared attractive on the surface, it had 
numerous flaws. First, the proposal that each elderly person receive the
17
same pension failed to recognize that some individuals had worked more 
diligently than others and might , thus, merit a higher pension. If 
legislators succumbed to public pressure and increased the benefit a- 
mount, taxes would subsequently have to be raised. Second, Dr. Townsend 
was also not very specific as to the amount of the sales tax which would 
fund the program. According to Holtzman's study, Townsend was often 
quoted as saying that the program would provide 20 to 24 billion dollars 
each year to America's elderly. Since retail taxes in 1933 were approxi­
mately 25.7 billion dollars, the sales tax required to produce Townsend's
sum would have to be between 80 and 90 percent. The American oublic would
56never support such a tax rate nor indeed, would it have been feasible. 
Therefore, a transaction tax of 2 percent was proposed by Townsend to take 
the place of the unmanageable retail sales tax. This tax would be charged 
on the goods each time they were sold, from raw material to finished product. 
Arthur Schlesinger states that opponents of the transaction sales tax viewed 
it as being "regressive and uncollectible. By raising prices, it would re­
duce purchasing power; it would wipe out profit margins for small business;
57it would promote economic concentration." Although Townsend's pension 
plan on the surface appeared to be an excellent solution, the method of 
financing the program was exposed as inadequate.
Third, Dr. Townsend's failure to develop the economic specifics of his 
pension plan is seen not only in funding proposals, but also in the reason­
ing which led to the selection of $200 for the pension. Dr. Townsend's 
reasoning for the $200 pension is revealed in a "sympathetic" biography a- 
bout him. Dr. Townsend said, '"First the glamor of a two-hundred-dollar
IB
pension. It will compel attention, and has a great psychological value. 
Second, with our figure set as high as $200 we can feel reasonably sure 
that no one will bring out a pension plan with a higher amount.1 The 
pension amount was chosen because it was appealing and competitive with 
other pension plans.
The Townsend pension plan was criticized by a wide variety of groups. 
The Socialists, Communists, Liberty Leaguers, American Federation of La­
bor, and National Association of Manufacturers were all against the Town-
59send pension plan. The Townsend plan also failed to gain support in 
the government. A revised plan was introduced in the House of Representa­
tives by Representative John S. McGroaty in April of 1935. The revised 
pension plan did not guarantee a $200 pension, but instead would provide 
a pension that reflected the amount of capital available in the reserve 
fund. The bill was defeated, as 200 congressmen were purposely absent 
from the voting while the remainder voted the proposal down without a roll 
call. Although the Townsend pension plan had the support of many of their
constituents, the congressmen did not view it as an adequate solution to
filthe situation of the elderly and the unemployed.
Another movement which advocated a solution to the depressed economic
state of America's workers and aged individuals was the Share Our Wealth
plan; Senator Huey Long from Louisiana announced the Share Our Wealth
62
plan in March of 1932. The plan required a redistribution of income and 
the establishment of safeguards to insure a stable living environment for 
the public. The government would liquidate all personal fortunes over
19
$3 million, thus providing the United States Treasury with approximately 
$170 billion. This fund would be used to provide every American family 
with $5000 to buy a home, a car, and a radio. The total amount of money 
which the treasury fund would distribute was estimated at $ 10 0 billion.
All individuals aged 60 or older would be given pensions of an “adequate" 
amount. The enaction of a minimum wage would guarantee all employees of 
a minimum yearly income of $2,500. The number of hours an employee worked 
would be limited to the amount of time needed to produce goods equal with 
the level of public consumption. The government would guarantee economic 
stability for the farmer by purchasing their surplus crops. The Share Our 
Wealth plan included a wide range of benefits which were slightly revised, 
after their initial proposal in 1932, in order to successfully compete with 
other emerging pension plans. The pensions the elderly were to receive were 
changed from $30 per month to an “adequate" amount, and the pension age was 
lowered from 65 to 60 years. The amount each family was to receive in­
creased from $4000 to $5000,^
The benefits of the Share Our Wealth Plan appealed to a diverse group
of individuals: farmers, city dwellers, the elderly, employees, and those
64hoping to continue their education. T. Harry Williams, in his biography
of Huey Long, notes that Lonn was supported nation-wide by 27,431 Share
Our Wealth clubs in which membership totaled 4.7 million. Long's clubs
required no membership dues which resulted in a large membership from the
depressed rural areas. The clubs were situated mainly in the far north
66
central and southern states.
Senator Huey Long's appeal promised material equality to many Americans
20
who were experiencing extreme economic hardship. It envisioned a society 
in which "'Every man was King, but no man wore the crown.'" Gerald L.
K. Smith, a Disciples of Christ preacher hired by Long, was successful in 
arousing support for the plan. Smith could be heard at rallies saying, 
"'Let's pull down these huge piles of gold until there shall be a real 
job. Not a little old sow-belly, black-eyed pea jobs but a real spending 
money, beefsteak and gravy, Chevrolet, Ford in the garage, new suit, Thomas 
Jefferson, Jesus Christ, red, white and blue job for every man!'"*’”
Although Senator Long's plan was appealing, it was economically un­
feasible. Schlesinger indicated that it was based on economic data from 
the 1918s. "He wildly overestimated what the government would gain from 
confiscation; he underestimated the number of families who would need to 
have their income jacked up to the $5,000 limit; he ignored the problems 
involved in redistributing nonmonetary wealth; and he showed little interest 
in such mundane Issuesas economic recovery." Long himself admitted that his 
plan was not based strictly on an economic analysis. "'I never read a line 
of Marx or Henry George or any of t.iem economists,' he once said. 'It's 
all in the law of God."1”’ Raymond Daniel, as a result of his in-depth 
coverage of Senator Long for the New York Times, said Long "did believe in 
Share Our Wealth 'with all his heart'; but if was a technique of political 
self aggrandizement, not as a gospel of social reconstruction. "70 Regarding 
Long's performance as a reformer, Allan P. Sindler in Huey Long's Louisiana 
states that, Long "revealed an undue concentration on tangible showy benefits 
at the expense of civic education and perhaps 1n ignorance of the deeper eco­
nomic and social problems of his state and nation. Senator Long also
21
failed to obtain support, for the Share Our Wealth plan from Democratic
leaders; a substantial proportion of the general public supported Long's
72
plan, but many members of Congress recognized its weakness.
The Lundeen plan, proposed by Representative Lundeen from Louisiana 
in 1934, was introduced in Congress as still another possible solution to 
unemployment. The Lundeen hill provided unemployment benefits for a vari­
ety of situations, including old age, unemployment, industrial injuries, 
and sickness. The only limitation on benefits was that the workers' unem­
ployment must be through no fault of their own. The plan would provide 
benefits to self-employed workers, such as lawyers and doctors, in addition 
to all hired employees. Benefits were to match local wages, with a minimum 
of ten dollars per week and three dollars for each dependent. The bill 
provided part time employees with benefits which would Increase their earn­
ings to a level equal with full time workers. This program was to be funded 
through taxes on inheritances, incomes exceeding $5000 a year, and gifts. 
Although the government would fund the program, it would not be involved in
administration. Individuals elected by farm and labor groups would manage
7T
the Lundeen program and would develop its rules and regulations.
Support existed for the Lundeen bill. Douglas reported in Social Securi­
ty in The United States that although the American Federation of Labor con­
demned it, many of the group's city associations and local unions supported 
the bill. The Lundeen bill was viewed as being based upon the same unemploy­
ment principle as the British Labor Party, that is, that "'work or maintenance'" 
should be provided for the u n e m p l o y e d . T h e  United States Communist party 
also endorsed the Lundeen bill. On March 15, 1935, the House Labor Committee
22
gave a favorable report of the bill. However, the House Ways and Means
Committee, concentrating upon the administration's social security bill,
never reviewed the Lundeen bill. Furthermore, the bill did not receive
75
consideration on the House floor.
Although the Lundeen bill had managed to gain support, there were 
criticisms regarding its feasibility. Three defects existed in the pro­
posed method of administration. First, while unemployment benefits were
designed to include self-employed workers, verifying unemployment among
76
such workers would be difficult. Second, funds would be provided by 
the government, yet since it would have no control over administration, 
there was no guarantee that the money would be used thoughtfully or ef­
ficiently. It plbced administrators in a highly vulnerable position be­
cause they would be determining benefits for the people who had elected 
them. Third, the administrative board would not be a very effective 
mechanism for convincing the unemployed to return to work, since the board 
relied upon the workers for their election. The bill failed to provide 
any motivation for the unemployed workers to locate new jobs, as they
would be guaranteed an adequate income to support their family if unem- 
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ployed. No limit was placed upon the number of days one could collect
78
unemployment benefits.
Finally, the system of funding was also economically unsound. Unem­
ployed workers eligible for benefits equaled, at a minimum, ten million In­
dividuals. Benefits would provide each unemployed worker with aoproximately 
one thousand dollars a year, or an annual total of at least ten billion dol­
lars. Since there were also provisions for elderly and the sick, government
23
would have to provide at least an additional ten billion. The total
outlay for the Lundeen bill almost equaled that of the Townsend plan.
Like the Townsend pension plan, It was not possible to finance the
79Lundeen plan from the existing national Income.
Yet many believed the benefits of the Lundeen bill outweighed its 
defects. Hearings held by the House Committee on Labor found such sup­
port for the Lundeen bill that the committee recommended its passage.®® 
However, when the bill was brought up as an amendment to the administra­
tion's social security bill, it was defeated 204 to 52. The proposed 
amendment gained support from Progressive and Farmer-Labor congressmen.
Government actions during the economic depression were both praised 
and criticized by Father Cahrles E. Coughlin, a politically active Catho­
lic priest. Through nationwide broadcasts, Father Coughlin had gained a 
large following: in 1934 he received more mail than any individual in the
United States, approximately 80,000 letters per week. Even critics con­
ceded that his weekly listening audience could be estimated at ten million 
82people.
This large audience was exposed to both Father Coughlin's support and 
condemnation of President Roosevelt's policies. Initially Father Coughlin 
supported Roosevelt's economic program. He could be heard "extolling the
0*3
New Deal cries of 'Roosevelt or Ruin!"' Later Father Coughlin declared 
himself opposed to the New Deal saying that, ,M you cannot have a New Deal 
without a new deck.1" And he viewed "'every card dealt' by Roosevelt so 
far had been marked for 'high finance* or 'big busines.'" Even after 
forming the National Union for Social Justice which was highly critical of
24
President Roosevelts policies, Father Coughlin could still be heard sup­
porting President Roosevelt on the radio. In regard to the proposed so­
cial security bill Father Coughlin stated that, “'outworn and unpractical 
phrases as 'free competition' and 'rugged individual ism' and 'laissez- 
faire1 today are seeking a resting place in the limbo of archaic false­
hoods.'" And referring to Roosevelt, Father Coughlin said, "'Today I be-
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lieve in him as much as ever.'" Schlessinger suggests that Coughlin was 
wavering between intense criticism and intense praise of the President 
either to keep his listeners from becoming either bored or because continu­
al disagreement with the president might alienate his audience.^
In 1934 Father Coughlin moved further away from the president when 
he formed the National Union for Social Justice. This group offered another 
method for dealing with the economic crisis of America, Father Coughlin's 
description of the Union was, “'a group of citizens not only dissatisfied
with the sham politics and sham policies existing in American, but anxious
87
for a cleansing of both political parties."' The citizens that were not 
content with the government and its actions could turn to the Union for ap­
peasement. The Union was designed to be a pressure group which could sway 
both political parties towards Coughlin's policies. The Union's extensive 
platform included: monetary policy, annual wage policy, the nationalization
of light, oil, natural gas, and power, the welfare of organized labor, and 
the consideration of human rights above property rights.®®
Inadequacies were revealed in the program of the National Union for 
Social Justice. Donald McCoy in Angry Voices stresses that, Instead of 
offering encouragement and guidance to a spontaneous organization of the
discontented by the discontented, Coughlin offered them a ready made
organization and ideology. Throughout the existence of the Union, any
form of real participation by the membership in its decision making seemed
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to be lacking.1" Schlessinger indicates that although few individuals 
perceived it* Father Coughlin's messages contained an "anti-semantic po­
tential" and a "facist implication." Schlessinger viewed Father Coughlin's
"growing hostility toward Roosevelt" as possibly the most damaging aspect
'90
to the support of his program.
However, the Roosevelt administration had to act very cautiously when 
dealing with Father Coughlin. As a result of the predominant Protestant 
affiliation of government officials, harsh treatment of Father Coughlin 
might result in "accusations of Klu Kluxism and religious persecution." 
Father Coughlin's program dealt with so many issues that responding to
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specific points with legislation or criticism was extremely difficult.
Each of these movements had an effect on the Roosevelt administraiton 
and its formulation of the social security bill. The possibility existed 
that the movements could have a significant effect on the 1936 presidential 
election. Sinder indicates that Huey Long's "political ambition should not 
be minimized"; Long was, in fact, attempting to gain support of the poor
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voters in order to obtain the Democratic presidential nomination in 1936.
A poll concerning third party possibilities, conducted by Emil a Hurja of 
the Democratic National Committee in the summer of 1935, revealed enormous 
support for Long. Hurja estimated that if Long ran for president, he could 
possibly receive 2.75 million votes. U?mocrat1c leaders were concerned 
over Long's growing popularity. President Roosevelt “spoke of the need of
26
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doing something to 'steal Long's thunder.'" With regard to Father 
Coughlin, President Roosevelt realized that the Catholic vote was extreme­
ly vital and any attack upon a Catholic priest might be viewed adversely. 
Thus President Roosevelt refrained from speaking out against Father 
Coughlin and possibly damaging his support from the Catholic voters.
The popularity of these proposals which promised assistance to indi­
viduals showed how vital it was for the administration to develop a program 
to deal with the situation of the elderly and unemployed workers, in refer­
ring to the Townsend plan, Douglas indicates "the widespread popular support
which it had obtained probably did weaken the die-hard opposition tc the
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security bill." The support that the radical Lundeen bill received also 
helped promote the belief that some form of social security had to be adopt­
ed. The administration indicated to "the indifferent and to the conserva­
tive that unless the latter accepted the moderate program put forth by 
the administration they might later be forced to accept the radical and far- 
reaching provisions of the Lundeen bi11.
Chapter III
Development of Social Security
Roosevelt strongly supported social insurance during his governor­
ship of New York. In February of 1929, Governor Roosevelt recommended 
to the state legislature the establishment of a commission to deal with 
the problem of old age assistance:
We can no longer be satisfied with the old method of 
putting them away in dismal institutions with the ac­
companying loss of self-respect, personality, and in­
terest in life. Poverty in old age should not be re­
garded either as a disgrace or necessarily as a lack 
of thrift. Usually it is a mere by-product of in­
dustrial life. An alarmingly increasing number of 
aged persons are becoming deoendnent on outside help 
for bare maintenance. While improved medical science 
has increased man’s span of life, the rapid pace of 
modern industry has proportionately increased the 
number of years during which he is an unsought employee.
. . . There is no reason why our state, which is one 
of the foremost centers of industry in the world, should 
not now investigate. . . the entire question of securi­
ty against old age want, to determine what, if anything, 
should be done by it to meet this rapidly growing prob­
lem within our own borders. 98
However, the predominately Republican state legislature did not share 
Roosevelt’s deep concern over these problems.^ In his annual message to 
the legislature in January of 1931, Roosevelt said that the law which emerged 
from the commission established to investigate the problem of security in 
old age was an inadequate solution:
its present form, although objectionable as providing
27
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for a gratuity* may be justified only as a means intended 
to replace to a large extent the existing methods of poor- 
house and poor-farm relief. Any great enlargement of the 
theory of this law would, however, smack of the practices 
of a dole. Our American aged do not want charity, but 
rather old age comforts to which they are rightfully en­
titled by their own thrift and foresight in the form of 
insurance. It is, therefore, my judgement that the next 
stop to be taken should be based on the theory of insurance 
by a system of contributions commencing at an early age.
In this way men and women will, on arriving at a period when 
work is no longer practical, be assured not merely of a roof 
overhead and enough food to keep body and soul together, but 
also enough income to maintain life during the balance of 
their days in accordance with the American standard of 
living. 100
Not only did most legislators disagree, their position reflected the limited
resources the state had to deal with its economic situation. ^
Roosevelt's advocacy of a social insurance program continued into his
presidency. In addressing Congress in June of 1934, he stated his desire for
a program which would provide security against the "'hazards and vicissitudes 
102
of life,'" He set up several guidelines for the program: it should be
funded by contribution as opposed to taxation, it should be a cooperative 
program between state and federal governments, and it had to be actuariallv 
sound. In January of 1935, Roosevelt recommended a Social Security pro­
gram to Congress. In his recommendation message he stressed that:
It is overwhelmingly important to avoid any danger of 
permanently discrediting the sound and necessary policy 
of Federal legislation for economic security by attempt­
ing to apply it on too ambitious a scale before actual 
experience has provided guidance for the permanently safe 
directions of such efforts. The place of such a funda­
mental in our future civilization is too precious to be 
jeopardized now by extravagant action. It is a sound idea-- 
a sound ideal. Most of the other advanced countries of the
world have already adopted it and their experience affords 
the knowledge that social insurance can be made a sound 
and workable project. 104
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Roosevelt had created a Committee on Economic Security to study the 
social insurance issue in June of 1934. Members of the committee were, 
its chairwoman, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Attorney General Homer 
Cunnings, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Federal Emergency 
Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins, and Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
Wallace. Arthur Altmeyer was selected to serve as chairman of the techni­
cal board on economic security. Dr. Edwin E. Witte, of the University of
Wisconsin, an expert in labor legislation and social insurance, was ao-
105pointed executive director.
Unemployment Compensation
The committee devoted a great deal of time to the unemployment compen­
sation issue. There was a division among the members on how the system 
was to be operated. Some believed a national system would guarantee uni­
form standards and equally distributed benefits. Those who advocated a 
system run by the states thought local experimentation and meeting needs of 
individual staes should take a higher priority. Witte and Altmeyer favored 
a state run system, while Hopkins, Perkins, and Wallace supported a federal 
compensation system. 06 In addition, a majority of the staff and the techni­
cal board supported a national program. 10 7 In the end, President Roosevelt
made it clear that he preferred an unemployment compensation system which
1 Oftwould be administered by the states.
Discussion regarding unemployment compensation systems prior to the 
formation of the Committee on Economic Security had focused on two approaches, 
the Wisconsin Plan and the Ohio Plan. The Wisconsin Plan was an unemployment
30
compensation system that had operated since 1932. Companies maintained 
unemployment funds for their employees, using "experience" or "merit" 
ratings. Each company would contribute to its reserve fund an amount of 
money reflecting the company's ability to i»aintain a stable employment 
level. High unemployment in the company would require a large contribu­
tion, while low unemployment would result in a low contribution to the 
109reserve fund. The Ohio Plan was developed by the Ohio Commission on
Unemployment in 1932. Under this sytem, unemployment funds would be pooled
into one large fund rather than being held by individual companies; the
plan required contributions from both employers and employees.^
Both of these plans received criticism from experts. Abraham Epstein,
executive secretary of the American Association for Old Age Security and
an informed writer in the social insurance field, viewed the Ohio Plan as
inadequate because it did not provide for active government participation.
Professor Paul Douglas, another expert in the social insurance field, joined
Epstein in criticizing the Wisconsin Plan, saying it falsely assumed that an
individual company could effectively control unemployment
However, the Wisconsin Plan had a definite advantage over the Ohio Plan:
it was already in operation. Reflecting on that system, Frances Perkins said
that it "'. . . allows these different problems to be solved by the States
according to their own particular genius and to be administered locally by
112
those states in the best interests of all people.'" The Committee on 
Economic Security believed they had a responsibility to advance the views 
of President Roosevelt as stated in his message to Congress on June 8, 1934. 
He had called for a plan that was based upon '"a maximum of cooperation be­
31
tween States and Federal government."'"^
As a result, the Committee on Economic Security considered two unem­
ployment compensation plans which reflected a state approach. One used 
as a basis the Wagner-Lewis bill which was introduced to Congress In Febru­
ary of 1934, and provided for a federal payroll tax on employers. If the 
state already had unemployment compensation laws then the amount collected 
by the state could be deducted from the federal tax. It included minimum
standards which the national system supporters wanted, but left adequate
114
freedom for local experimentation. The other approach was a subsidy of 
a certain percentage of the tax to those states with unemployment compansa- 
tion laws that met certain federal standards. The subsidy plan gave the
11C
federal government more control of the unemployment compensation program.
Support for these unemployment compensation plans differed. The Ad­
visory Council on Economic Security favored the subsidy plan by a vote of 
9 to 7. The Technical Board on Economic Security supported the Wagner Lewis 
approach. And In November of 1934 a National Conference on Economic Security 
favored a national unemployment compensation plan. There was also the possi­
bility that the national plan could be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. ® The fact that President Roosevelt had given his support to the
117
Wagner Lewis bill also had to be considered. After vacilating between the 
two plans and a more national aoproach, the Committee on Economic Security
HR
decided to recommend the unemployment system based on the Wagner Lewis bill. 
National Insurance System for the Aged
The Committee on Economic Security also devised a national insurance
32
for the aged. This plan was developed more easily since there were no
existing old age insurance programs to consider. The public had been
made aware of the need for old age pensions by groups s~wh as the Townsend
movement, and that awareness gave the committee greater liberty in develop-
ing old age insurance. A national program appeared necessary because
of the extreme mobility of individuals and the long term vested interests
that would be developed by such an insurance program. Thus, although
it ran the risk of being declared unconst■futional, the federal approach
121was deemed best.
Two different methods of funding the old age insurance program were 
proposed. Initially, a compulsory system of contributory payments by which 
workers would accumulate benefits to orovide for their old aye security 
was developed. Providing benefits for already retired workers or workers 
about to retire met with some difficulty, the committee decided that the 
government would have to contribute to the insurance program to create an 
adequate reserve to provide benefits for already retired workers. The com­
mittee estimated that by 1980, the government would be contributing $1.4 
billion a year. ‘"The plan we advocate'said the Committee, 'amounts to 
having each generation Day for the support of the people then living who 
are old. ' " 122
The alternative method of funding the old age insurance program was 
suggested by Secretary of the Treasury Morganthau. He proposed that the 
rate of mandatory contributions be raised in order to accumulate a larger 
reserve fund, so that it would not be necessary for the government to subsi­
dize the old age insurance program. This plan shifted the responsibility
33
of pairing for the aging and retired workers to the young wage earning popu­
lation; Abraham Epstein believed this old age insurance program would ,Mac­
tually relieve the wealthy from their traditional obligation under the an­
cient poor laws.1" However, this was the plan that was implemented to fund
123
the old age insurance program.
The method of unding the old age insurance program orotected workers' 
self-esteem. They would earn a right to benefits upon retirement since 
they would contribute throughout their years of employment.^ In addition, 
the fact that the government would not be contributing meant that the pro-
1 pc
gram would be independent of the whims of each succeeding Congress.
President Roosevelt summed up the situation saying, H,We put those payroll 
contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and po­
litical right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits.
With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social se-
t .,126curity program."
In addition to the old age insurance program, the committee also recom­
mended assistance to needy aged, needy dependent children, and blind indi­
viduals. Sickness and health insurance was not included in the recommenda­
tions because f the intense lobbying pressure from the American Medical
127Association.
In January 1935, the President presented t© Compress the Committee re­
port with his endorsement, encouraging the legislators to take immediate
12Raction on the program.
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The social security proposal met with both positive an i negative 
reactions. The National Retail Dry Goods Association and the United 
States Chamber of Commerce viewed the bill favorably. The American Asso­
ciation of Social Workers, while generally supportive, felt the program' > 
effectiveness was lessened when the Category of needy individuals was 
limited to the elderly, blind and dependent children. Business leader- 
tended to react negatively. The Illinois Manufacturers Association, the 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, the National Publishers Association, the National
Metal Trades Association, and national Association of Manufacturers refused
1 ?9to support the social security bill. George P. Chandler, of the Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce, stated 1,1 the downfall of Rome started with corn laws, 
and legislation of that type.,M James L. Donnely, of the Illinois Manu­
facturers' Association, believed the social security bill would "undermine 
our national life 'by destroying initiative, discouraging thrift, and stif­
ling individual responsibility.,M Charles Denby, Jr., of the American Bar
Association, stated that social security legislation "'sooner or later will
130
bring about the Inevitable abandonment of private capitalism.
Republicans in Congress also reacted negatively. Congressman James W.
Wadsworth of New York said, "'This bill opens the door and invites the en­
trance into the political field, of a power so vast, so powerful as to 
threaten the integrity of our institutions and to pull the pillars of the 
temple down upon the heads of our descendants.1" New York Congressman John 
Taber stated that, '"Never in the history of the world has any measure 
brought in here so insidiously designed as to prevent business recovery,
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to enslave workers, and to prevent any possibility of the employers pro-
131
viding work for the people."' Senator Gore from Oklahoma, when ad­
dressing Frances Perkins, asked “‘wouldn't you agree that there is a 
teeny-weeny bit of socialism in your program? ' “132 The Republicans, af­
ter continually denouncing the Social Security bill, eventuallly supported
the legislation since doing other wise might result in negative repercus-
133
sions at the polls. The Social Security bill was passed by the House, 
371 to 33, and by the Senate, 77 to 6.
Several changes were made in the Social Security bill by Congress.
The House Ways and Means Committee eliminated a provision which would have 
enabled employers, if state law permitted, to obtain a reduction in their 
contribution rate if they had records of low unemployment; the committee 
believed this would disrupt the uniformity of the tax rate which could re­
sult in unfair interstate competition and possibly cause the bill to be 
declared unconstitutional. The committee also changed the method of ad­
ministering the program. Instead of requiring that states employ a merit 
system when hiring employees to administer the benefits, they required only 
that states engage in efficient administrative methods; development of 
hiring systems were left to the states. Committee member Frank Vinson 
from Kentucky stated, “'No damned social workers are going to come into my 
State to tell our people whom they shall hire.'“ Lastly, the Ways and 
Means Committee developed the Social Security Board, an independent federal 
agency which would administer the various benefits--old age insurance, un­
employment insurance, aid to dependent children--included in the overall 
program. The Committee on foanomic Security had placed the Social Insurance
36
Board in the Department of Labor, with old age and dependent children
benefits to be administered by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.
The Senate Finance Committee also modified the bill. It eliminated a
clause stating that if states wished to obtain federal grants for old age
assistance, they must assist the elderly in order to raise their income to
a level which was '"a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and
health. "' The committee believed this provision gave federal administrators
excessive discretion in determining what was '"compatible with decency and 
136
h e a l t h . T h e  Finance Committee, like House Ways and Means, did not 
want to give the federal government extensive control over the social securi­
ty system. Thus, they also adopted an amendment which allowed each state to 
act under its own discretion in forming state unemployment systems. In ad­
dition, the Senate committee added a requirement that "regular employment" 
was necessary to receive old age insurance, and added federal grants to
states in order to provide aid to the blind and assistance with vocational
137rehabilitation.
*
Continual discussion and revision of the Social Security bill led to
1 3ft
its eventual approval and passage by the Congress on June 19, 1935, It 
was signed into law by President Roosevelt on August 14, 1935.
The Social Security program emerged in a climate of high unemployment, 
a period of poverty for many of America's elderly, and an extremely depressed
economic state. Several diffe ren t  proposals emerged promising assistance 
to the elderly and the unemployed workers--the Townsend Old Age Pension 
Plan, Long's Share Our Wealth Han, the Lundeen bill, and Father Coughlin's 
National Union for Social Justice. During the depression, traditional sources
135
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of did to unemployed workers and the needy clderly-.^'ini^Qy^g^^ charities, 
friends, dnd relatives--proved inddequate. Initially, the Roosevelt ad­
ministration provided aid for citizens through programs such as, civil 
works and federal emergency relief. Later however, President Roosevelt 
supported in Congress social security legislation which provided benefits 
for retired workers, unemployed workers, needy elderly, needy dependent 
children, and the blind. The passage of the social security bill and 
its subsequent signing into law by President Roosevelt was part of the 
Roosevelt administration's solution to the economic depression of the 
1930s.
FOOTNOTES
Gaston V. 
America, and Russ
Rimlinger, Wei fare Policy And Industrialization l£ 
ia (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971). P*
2n. .. 
Rimlinger, P. 194.
3
Rimlinger, p . 195.
4
Rimlinger, PP . 195-196.
5
Rimlinger, P* 197.
^Rimlinger, P. 194.
'Rimlinger, P. 198.
8_ , -, 
Rimlinger, pp. 197-198.
g
I.M. Rubinow, The Quest For Social Security (New York:
10Rubinow, p. 33.
11 Rubinow, p. 332.
^Caroline Bird, The Invisible Scar (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.,
1966), o. xiv.
13Bird, p. 91.
38
39
Dexter, Perkins, The New Age Of Franklin Roosevelt (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957J, pp. 6-7/
15
Roy Lubove, The Struggle For Social Security (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 114.
'^Abraham Holtzman, The Townsend Hovement (New York: Bookman
Associates, Inc., 1963), p. IfT.
^Lubove, p. 116.
1ft
Holtzman, p. 21. 
noltzman, p. 22.
20David Hackett Fischer, Growing Old In America (London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1978), p. 163.
^Lubove, p. 116.
^Lubove, pp. 116-117.
^Lubove, p. 117.
^Rimlinger, p. 194.
^Riinlinger, p. 210.
^lubove, p. 133.
^Lubove, pp. 133-134.
^®Lubove, pp. 132-133.
29
14
Holtzman, p. 23.
40
30
Press, 1976),Jp.P23!t’ —  ^  (Chicago: University of Chicago
^Fischer, p. 160.
32
Fischer, p. 160.
33
Rimlinger, p. 198. 
34_.
Fischer, p. 158.
MifflinAc J X ? ;  1 9 5 8 ) ^ 1 ^ ^0 ^ 2 6 4 ^ 5 ^  (B°St0n: Hou<lhton
36.
37
38
39
40
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 267. 
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, d . 268. 
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 279.
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, o. 270.
*
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, o. 272.
41
42
43
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 273. 
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 274. 
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 278.
44
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, pp. 274-275
45Holtzman, p. 32.
41
blames Gollin, The Star Spangled Retirement Dream (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), p. 109.
^GolUn, p. 109.
48Gollin, p. 114.
^’Holtzman, o. 43.
88Holtzman, p. 43.
8*Holtzman, p. 44.
52Holtzman, n. 47.
^Holtzman, p. 26.
84Holtzman, p. 46.
55Go111n, p. 115.
56
Holtzman, n. 38.
57
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 357
88Holtzman, p. 38.
59
Holtzman, p. 38.
fiO
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p. 35.
"Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p. 37.
42
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p. 62.
63
Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana (Baltimore: John HoDkins 
Press, 1956), p. 84.
^Sindler, p. 84.
65Gollin, p. 110.
^Sindler, p. 85.
87Sindler, p. 83.
68Gollin, p. 110.
CQ
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p. 63.
78Schles1nger, Politics Of Upheaval. p. 67.
71Sindler, p. 107.
^Sindler, p. 85.
73Pau1 H. Douqlas, Social Security In The United States ( New York: 
McGraw-H111, 1936), pp. W-J5.
74
Dounlas, pp. 76-77.
75
Arthur J. Altmeyer, Formative Years of Social Security (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 196^), p. 31.
7®Doug1as, p. 77.
770ouglas, pp. 78-79.
62
43
78
Douglas, p. 76.
79
Douglas, pp. 80-81.
80
81
Douglas, pp. 81-82.
Douglas, p. 109.
82
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval. p. 20.
83„.
Life (NeD:^ 0:^ f ^ nMa^0^ 1nadn^^^ a rn;, ; m l T ^ T u  SL SSSTlcan
84
1958), p?ni24.R* MCC°y ’ ¥okes (Kansas: University of Kansas Press,
85c . .
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval. p. 25.
86r . 1
schlesinger, Politics Of Upheavals p. 24.
87
McCoy, o. 119.
88
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval. pp. 24-25. 
89
McCoy, p. 119.
90c ., .
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p, 27.
^MeCoy, p. 134.
92
Sindler, p. 86.
93
Schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, pp. 251-252.
44
'Sindler, pp. 86-87.
schlesinger, Politics Of Upheaval, p. 250.
96
Douglas, p. 73.
97
Douglas, p. 82.
98
Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (New York: RandonTRouse, 1938), I, pp. 205-210.
^Elliott A. Rosen, Hoover. Roosevelt, und the Brains Trust (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 197^), p. 12.
100Rosenman, pp. 102-103.
^Rosen, p. 113.
102
Samuel I. Rosenman, The Publ1c Papers and Addresses of Franklin 0. 
Roosevelt (New York: Random House, T938T7 TV7 p. 43.
m i
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 304.
* ^ Rosenman, p. 44.
^Altmeyer, p. 7.
^Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, pp. 304-305.
^Altmeyer, p. 23.
108
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 305.
10Q
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 301.
 ^ ^Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 302.
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 302.
111
112
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 305.
13Altmeyer, p. 17.
114c .. .
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, pp. 302-303. 
115
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 305.
116C .. .
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 306. 
7Altmeyer, p. 17.
^Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 306.
119
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 307.
120
Rlmlinger, p. 224.
121
Altmeyer, p. 25.
122
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 309.
123
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 310.
124
Rimlinger, p. 226.
125
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt. p.jlO.
126c u, ,
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p.p. 308-309. 
127
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 307.
Altmeyer, p. 29.
129
Altmeyer, p. 33.
130
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 311.
131
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, pp. 311-J12.
132Go11in, p. 113,
133
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 312.
134
Altmeyer, pp. 38-41.
13C
'Altmeyer, pp. 35-36.
136
Altmeyer, p. 39.
137
Altmeyer, pp. 40-41.
138
Schlesinger, Age Of Roosevelt, p. 312.
139
128
Altmeyer, p. 42.
47
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Altmeyer, Arthur J.. Formative Years of Social Security. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press,"T9BF.
Bird, Caroline. The Invisible Scar. New York: David McKay Company,
Inc., 1966.
Conkin, Paul K.. FDR and the Origins of the Welfare State. New York: 
Thomas Y. CroweTl"'Company, l§67.
Douglas, Paul H.. Social Security In The United States. New York: 
McGraw-H111, 191FI
Fischer, David Hackett. Growing Old In America. London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1978.
Fox, Dixon Ryan, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, ed. A History of American
Life. Vol. XIII: The Age of the Great Depression. By Dixon Wecter. 
RewYork: Macmillan Company, 1548.
Gol11n, James. The Star Spangled Retirement Dream. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1981.
Holtzman, Abraham. The Townsend Movement. New York: Bookman Associates,
Inc., 1963.
Lubove, Roy. The Struggle for Social Security. Massachusetts: Harvard 
Un 1 vers 1 tyTr ess, 1968.
McCoy, Donald R.. Angry Voices. Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1958.
48
Perkins, Dexter. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press,”T§57/
Pratt, Henry J.. The Gray Lobby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976.
Rimlinger, Gaston V.. Welfare Policy and Industrialization In Europe, 
America, And Russia. New Vork: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., lWT.
Rosen, Elliot A.. Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977.
Rosenman, Samuel I.. The Genesis Of The New Deal. Vul. I of The Public 
Papers And Addresses of FrankTTn D. Roosevelt. New York: Random 
fimlsiT T53K----------------------------------
Roseman, Samuel I.. The Court Disapproves. Vol. IV of The Public Papers 
And Addresses of~FrankVir. D. Roosevelt. New York: Random House, 1938.
Rubinow, I.M.. The Quest For Social Security. New York: Henry Holt And 
Company, 19317
Schlesinger, Arthur M.. The Coming Of The New Deal. Vol. II of The Age Of 
Roosevelt. Boston: Houghton HTTflin Company, 1958.
Schlesinger, Arthur M.. The Politics Of Upheaval. Cambridge: The River
side Press, 1960.
Sindler, Allan P.. Huey Long's Louisiana. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
1956.
